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Summary
This study analysed the available data of seroprevalence to human influenza
viruses in pigs in Cambodia using generalized linear mixed models in order to
improve understanding of factors underlying the spread of human influenza
viruses in Cambodian pigs. The associations between seroprevalence against
seasonal H1N1 influenza virus in pigs and the population density of humans
and pigs were not significant. However, a positive association between anti-H3
antibodies in pigs and the human population density was identified. In con-
trast, there was a negative association between seroprevalence of H3N2 in pigs
and the pig population density. Our study has highlighted the difficulty in
identifying epidemiological risk factors when a limited data set is used for
analyses. We therefore provide recommendations on data collection for future
epidemiological analyses that could be improved by collecting metadata related
to the animals sampled. In addition, serosurveillance for influenza A viruses in
pigs in high-risk areas or at slaughterhouses is recommended in resource-
limited countries.
Introduction
Influenza A viruses are members of the family Orthomyxo-
viridae and are categorized into different subtypes on the
basis of the antigenic properties of envelope glycoproteins,
including haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA).
Pigs have been proposed to play an important role in the
ecology of influenza A viruses due to their susceptibility to
influenza viruses from both human and avian species
(Brockwell-Staats et al., 2009), facilitating genetic reassort-
ment between viruses and avian-to-human virus adaptation
(Ito et al., 1998). These processes possibly lead to the gen-
eration of new variants of influenza viruses with pandemic
potential (Landolt and Olsen, 2007).
Since its emergence in humans in 2009, the A(H1N1)
pdm09 virus has been evolving within pig populations in
many countries through reassortment events with other
endemic swine influenza strains (Vijaykrishna et al., 2010;
Ducatez et al., 2011; Howard et al., 2011; Kitikoon et al.,
2011; Moreno et al., 2011; Starick et al., 2011; Tremblay
et al., 2011; Fan et al., 2012; Hiromoto et al., 2012). In the
USA, the new reassortant of swine H3N2 virus with the M
gene from the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus (A(H3N2)v) emerged
in pigs in 2009 (Wong et al., 2012). Later in August 2011,
the first infection of humans in the USA with the A(H3N2)
v virus was reported. It was suspected that the M gene may
have contributed to increased transmissibility from pigs to
humans and also between people (Wong et al., 2012). The
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evidence of novel reassortant viruses emerging in pigs high-
lights the increasing complexity of influenza virus charac-
teristics that could potentially lead to the generation of new
viruses with increased virulence and cross-species transmis-
sibility. Therefore, systematic global surveillance for influ-
enza A viruses in pig populations should be carried out in
order to understand the current situation of influenza in
the world and to promptly detect the emergence of new
influenza variants.
In Cambodia, the livestock sector is dominated by small-
holders (Huynh et al., 2007). Poultry and livestock produc-
tion plays an important role in poverty reduction as well as
in wealth creation for smallholders, accounting for nearly
5% of Cambodia’s gross domestic product (GDP) and
15.8% of agricultural GDP (Chetra and Bourn, 2009; Tor-
nimbene and Drew, 2012). Primarily, pig management in
Cambodia is traditional, where animals are raised with low
biosecurity, facilitating the opportunity for contact between
humans and pigs. Only a few commercial pig farms exist in
Cambodia, and these are located in Kandal Province near
Phnom Penh City where they produce pork and other pig
products to meet the high urban demand (Chetra and
Bourn, 2009; Tornimbene and Drew, 2012). To date, there
have been no influenza viruses isolated from Cambodian
pigs. However, the recent serological study by Rith et al.
(2013) has demonstrated extensive infections with human-
origin influenza viruses, including the seasonal H1N1,
H3N2 and A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses in pigs in Cambodia.
Importantly, evidence that some pigs have been exposed to
more than one human influenza virus has been found (Rith
et al., 2013). The finding of potential multiple infections
with human influenza viruses in pigs represents a substan-
tial risk for pandemic virus creation through reassortment
events. Therefore, further studies on human influenza
viruses in pigs in Cambodia are essential in order to investi-
gate the factors with a potential to influence disease trans-
mission.
In this study, the only serological data available in Cam-
bodia were used to run generalized linear mixed models in
order to study the relationship between infections of sea-
sonal H1N1 and H3N2 influenza viruses in Cambodian
pigs and certain environmental factors, including human
and pig density. We also provide proposed strategies for
enhancing data collection and recommendations for sur-
veillance of influenza viruses in pigs that can help epidemi-
ologists design future studies and surveillance schemes,
particularly for low-income countries.
Materials and Methods
Study population
Existing laboratory data (n = 1147) on the serological evi-
dence of infection of pigs from Cambodia with human
influenza were examined. The data were sourced from the
National Veterinary Research Institute (NaVRI) of Cambo-
dia and the Institut Pasteur in Cambodia (IPC) and repre-
sented samples collected between 2006 and 2010. The
samples from NaVRI were collected at farms in several
provinces, while those from the IPC were obtained from
the slaughterhouse in Phnom Penh. The samples were sub-
divided by sampling occasion based on the province of pig
origin, the sampling location and the sampling date
(Fig. 1).
Each sample was tested by haemagglutination inhibition
(HI) assays for antibodies against the reference strain of
seasonal human H1N1 and H3N2 influenza viruses from
the year of sampling of that specific sample (Rith et al.,
2013). The specimens were considered positive if their HI
titres were ≥1 : 40. The 95% confidence intervals for the
seroprevalence by sampling occasion were calculated using
the exact binomial method (Ross, 2003).
The factors that might increase the possibility of human-
to-pig contact or facilitate airborne and mechanical trans-
mission of human influenza viruses to pigs were selected.
These included the population density of pigs, humans and
poultry and road density. The last three factors represented
risk factors for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)
H5N1 in several spatial studies (Gilbert et al., 2008; Tiensin
et al., 2009; Loth et al., 2010; Yupiana et al., 2010; Martin
et al., 2011). The data on pig and poultry population den-
sity by province during 2006–2008 were obtained from the
report by Chetra and Bourn (2009) (see the Fig S1). Data
on human population density by province in 2008 were
provided by the National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of
Planning, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The georeferenced road
density data were obtained from FAO GeoNetwork (http://
www.fao.org/geonetwork/). Data were analysed using Arc-
GIS9 (Environmental System Research Institute, Redlands,
CA, USA).
Statistical analyses
The relationship between seroprevalence to seasonal H1N1
and H3N2 influenza viruses and the selected factors was
examined using generalized linear mixed models
(GLMMs). Firstly, the variables to include in the model
were selected as fixed effects based on Pearson’s correlation
coefficient (PCC) of each pair of all those factors. Accord-
ing to the study by Graham (2003), pairs of variables with a
PCC ≥ 0.28 were considered associated and were tested
separately in the models. In order to take into account the
potential variations between the sources of samples, sam-
pling occasion and year of sampling were included into the
models as random effects. All statistical analyses were per-
formed in R (http://www.r-project.org). The models were
performed with the ‘glmer’ function in the ‘lme4’ package
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in the R environment, using a logit link function with
Laplace approximation of a maximum-likelihood method
assuming a binomial distribution (Gaidet et al., 2012). The
Akaike information criterion (AIC) was used to compare
the models.
Results
Seroprevalence by sampling occasion
The seroprevalence against seasonal H1N1 and H3N2 influ-
enza viruses for each sampling occasion is summarized in
Table 1. There were 19 sampling occasions from 9 prov-
inces across Cambodia during 2006–2010. The number of
serum specimens collected at each sampling occasion varied
widely (9–333). The seroprevalence against seasonal H1N1
virus ranged from 0 to 52.2%, whereas the prevalence of
anti-H3 antibodies varied from 0 to 43.3%.
Selection of fixed effects
Road density and poultry density were removed from the
model because of their high correlation coefficient with
human density and pig density, respectively (Table 2). The
two variables included in the model as fixed effects were
human density and pig density because we expected that
these two variables would have the strongest impact on the
pig seroprevalence, despite their PCC being superior to
0.28 (Table 2).
The models used for investigating factors influencing
seroprevalence
According to AIC, the high-ranking models fitted to ana-
lyse the variations in seroprevalence against seasonal H1N1
and H3N2 influenza viruses in Cambodian pigs are shown
in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. The best-supported models
for H1N1 and the top three best-supported models for
H3N2 included human population density and pig popula-
tion density (Tables 3 and 4). The random effects of year
and sampling occasion contributed to most of the random
part of the high-ranking models. The highest ranking
model for H1N1 included sampling occasion as a random
effect, while that for H3N2 showed year mostly accounted
for the random part (Tables 3 and 4).
Statistical analyses
No significant association between seroprevalence of
H1N1 and the population density of humans or pigs was
found (Table 3). Seroprevalence of H3N2 was positively
Fig. 1. Map of Cambodia showing administrative units divided into 24 provinces with geographical variations in number of sampling occasions
(legend) and number of samples collected in various provinces (number below province name).
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associated with density of the human population, whereas
it was negatively related to the pig population density
(Table 4).
Discussion
Seroprevalence data on seasonal human H1N1 as well as
seasonal human H3N2 influenza viruses in Cambodian pigs
used in this study were obtained from a study previously
reported by Rith et al. (2013). All serum specimens were
tested by HI assays, which are the prime serological test for
influenza A viruses in pigs (Van Reeth et al., 2006). It is
important to note that serological cross-reactivity between
subtypes could be observed if pigs on farms had been
infected or vaccinated with various influenza virus subtypes
and variants, including swine influenza viruses (Van Reeth
et al., 2006). Recently, serological cross-reaction to the A
(H1N1)pdm09 virus has been detected in pigs that were
previously infected or vaccinated with European swine
influenza viruses (Kyriakis et al., 2010). To our knowledge
however, no autogenous or commercial vaccines against
swine influenza have been used in Cambodian pigs. The
respiratory specimens of 1000 pigs sampled in a slaughter-
house in Phnom Penh during 2006–2008 all tested negative
for influenza A viruses using molecular techniques, proba-
bly because farmers refrained from sending sick animals to
the slaughterhouse as they would be examined by veterinar-
ians and rejected if symptoms were observed (Institut Pas-
teur in Cambodia, unpublished data). In addition,
antibodies against A(H1N1)pdm09 were not detected in
pigs before the virus started to widely circulate in the
human population in Cambodia (Rith et al., 2013), sug-
gesting that swine influenza viruses capable of generating
cross-reactive antibodies against the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus
did not previously circulate in Cambodian pigs. Thus, we
Table 1. Results of seroprevalence of seasonal H1N1 and H3N2 antibodies by sampling occasion and data on investigated factors for each sampling
occasion used in the statistical analyses
Occasion
Province Month Year Source Location n






















2008 IPC Abattoir 23 52.2 (30.6–73.2) 13.0 (2.8 –33.6) 101.5 16.3 78.1 9.5
2 Kampong
Cham
2 2006 NaVRI Farm 333 4.2 (2.3 –7.0) 2.7 (1.2 –5.1) 171.5 21.2 217.1 8.9
3 Kampong
Speu
7 2006 NaVRI Farm 60 15.0 (7.1 –26.6) 0.0 (0.0 –6.0) 102.1 23.7 206.5 7.8
4 Kampot 12 2007 IPC Abattoir 19 0.0 (0.0 –17.6) 0.0 (0.0 –17.6) 120.1 29.9 226.9 9.6
5 Kandal 12 2007 IPC Abattoir 25 12.0 (2.5 –31.2) 0.0 (0.0 –13.7) 354.6 38.9 326.5 16.5
6 Kandal 6, 7,
8, 9
2008 IPC Abattoir 97 53.6 (43.2 –63.8) 43.3 (33.3 –53.7) 354.6 32.4 281.5 16.5
7 Kandal 11 2010 IPC Abattoir 60 8.3 (2.8 –18.4) 3.3 (0.4 –11.5) 354.6 32.4 281.5 16.5
8 Prey Veng 12 2007 IPC Abattoir 9 0.0 (0.0 –33.6) 0.0 (0.0 –33.6) 194.0 82.7 421.3 9.2
9 Prey Veng 11 2010 IPC Abattoir 157 12.7 (8.0 –19.0) 2.6 (0.7 –6.4) 194.0 69.9 442.3 9.2
10 Pursat 12 2007 IPC Abattoir 27 0.0 (0.0 –12.8) 0.0 (0.0 –12.8) 31.3 6.5 77.8 5.9
11 Pursat 5, 6, 7,
8, 9
2008 IPC Abattoir 99 46.5 (36.4 –56.8) 42.4 (32.5 –52.8) 31.3 6.4 67.7 5.9
12 Svay Rieng 12 2007 IPC Abattoir 12 0.0 (0.0 –26.5) 0.0 (0.0 –26.5) 162.8 59.6 268.5 13.4
13 Svay Rieng 5, 6,
7, 8
2008 IPC Abattoir 50 30.0 (17.9 –44.6) 8.0 (2.2 –19.2) 162.8 59.6 268.5 13.4
14 Svay Rieng 11 2010 IPC Abattoir 55 16.4 (7.8 –28.8) 3.6 (0.4 –12.5) 162.8 59.6 268.5 13.4
15 Takeo 12 2007 IPC Abattoir 21 0.0 (0.0 –16.1) 0.0 (0.0 –16.1) 236.9 58.9 520.8 10.8
16 Takeo 11 2009 NaVRI Farm 36 13.9 (4.7 –29.5) 19.4 (8.2 –36.0) 236.9 51.4 627.9 10.8
17 Takeo 8, 11 2010 NaVRI Farm 25 0.0 (0.0 –13.7) 0.0 (0.0 –13.7) 236.9 51.4 627.9 10.8
18 Takeo 2 2010 NaVRI Farm 11 18.2 (2.3 –51.8) 0.0 (0.0 –28.5) 236.9 51.4 627.9 10.8
19 Takeo 11 2010 IPC Abattoir 28 21.4 (8.3 –41.0) 0.0 (0.0 –12.3) 236.9 51.4 627.9 10.8
Table 2. The Pearson correlation coefficients calculated for selecting











Pig density 0.38 1.0
Poultry density 0.54 0.67 1.0
Road density 0.84 0.31 0.20 1.0
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speculate that the serological results demonstrating infec-
tion with influenza viruses of human origin in Cambodian
pigs most likely reflected the real situation.
The associations between seroprevalence to seasonal
H1N1 and H3N2 influenza viruses in pigs and two
selected factors, human density and pig density, were
determined. No associations between seasonal influenza
prevalence to H1N1 in pigs and the studied factors were
detected. The seroprevalence against H1N1 could be com-
plicated by an appearance of the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus
after its emergence in April 2009 as the virus has replaced
the seasonal influenza A(H1N1) virus in humans world-
wide and also has been circulating in pig populations fol-
lowing transmission from humans to pigs (Forgie et al.,
2011). The seroprevalence of H3N2 influenza virus in pigs
was positively associated with the density of the human
population. This finding suggests that the high density of
humans in Cambodia may contribute to the high level of
infection in pigs, possibly by spill-over from humans
through close contact between humans and pigs on farms.
Road density was not included in the model because it
was highly correlated with human density. Thus, the cor-
relation between human density and H3N2 seroprevalence
may also be related to a high road density that could have
resulted from the transportation of infected pigs and
contaminated fomites, which may play a key role in
human-mediated transmission of influenza viruses to pigs.
Overall, these findings indicate that infections of Cambo-
dian pigs with human influenza viruses could be related,
in general, to human activities.
The seroprevalence of H3N2 influenza virus in Cambo-
dian pigs was negatively associated with the density of the
pig population, suggesting that provinces with high pig
density have fewer influenza infections. This may imply
Table 3. Summary of the best-supported models fitted to estimate the variations in seroprevalence against seasonal H1N1 influenza viruses in pigs in
Cambodia
Model AIC k










1 52.70 3 1.2581 0.0012 0.0083 0.15 0.14
2 52.78 2 1.2564 0.0058 0.27
3 52.90 2 1.2804 0.0008 0.30
4 54.70 4 1.2581 9.27E-13 0.0012 0.0083 0.15 0.14
5 54.78 3 1.2564 5.78E-17 0.0058 0.27
6 54.90 3 1.2804 0.00 0.0008 0.30
7 61.38 2 1.2674 0.0048 0.37
8 61.61 2 1.2755 0.0006 0.45
9 62.22 3 1.2556 0.0009 0.0066 0.28 0.24
aVariance estimation.
Table 4. Summary of the best-supported models fitted to estimate the variations in seroprevalence against seasonal H3N2 influenza viruses in pigs in
Cambodia
Model AIC k








1 47.52 3 3.3149 0.0031 0.0350 0.0030 ** 9.03E-05 ***
2 47.68 3 4.8402 0.0030 0.0345 0.0040 ** 9.7E-05 ***
3 49.52 4 1.92E-10 3.3148 0.0031 0.0350 0.0030 ** 9.03E-05 ***
4 54.09 2 5.0361 0.0217 0.0015 **
5 54.44 2 3.3022 0.0215 0.0016 **
6 56.09 3 5.0360 1.26E-11 0.0217 0.0015 **
7 64 2 4.8164 0.0008 0.3740
8 64.11 2 3.2186 0.0009 0.3415
9 66.01 3 1.2590 2.6569 0.0008 0.3642
aVariance estimation.
bSignificant codes: 0 ‘***’, 0.001 ‘**’.
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that pigs in the areas with high population densities are
bred in commercial farms with good husbandry practices.
Indeed, <1 per cent of pig producers operate on a commer-
cial level (Huynh et al., 2007; Tornimbene and Drew,
2012). Thus, this result should be interpreted with caution
because the statistical analysis may be compromised by
some level of spatial bias that could have arisen from the
non-randomly collected samples. To illustrate, the data
analysed represented combined serological results of serum
samples that were sourced from the NaVRI’s surveys at
farms in 3 provinces and the IPC’s surveys at the slaughter-
house in Phnom Penh. Moreover, data on the density of
the pig population were analysed at a provincial level,
which may cover different densities of pig population. The
underlying variations in pig farm management within the
provinces, such as husbandry practices, biosecurity and
hygiene, may also interfere with the result. Therefore, this
study has demonstrated the limitations of analysing risk
factors when relying on pre-existing surveys with limited
data sets.
Although the data were useful to assess the circulation
of the virus or to determine the dominant influenza
strains in pigs in the country (Rith et al., 2013), using
them to identify risk factors appears to be challenging
owing to the data set not being comprehensively distrib-
uted and the limited supporting information (Fig. S1) of
the data set collected. In the absence of accurate spatial
data, the only metadata available here were the origin of
the pigs at a provincial level, making our analysis
restricted to a provincial scale. Thus, the results from this
study can only be used to crudely analyse the association
between the prevalence of human influenza viruses in pigs
and certain factors. We recommend that sampling meth-
ods should be improved and metadata related to the ani-
mals sampled should be systematically collected at farms
or abattoirs for epidemiological studies (prevalence, case–
control studies, etc.) in order to effectively identify and
quantify the drivers of influenza virus infection in pigs.
The list of essential data should include precise farm loca-
tions (at least the village and district of origin of the ani-
mal), animal age, farm type and farm husbandry practices
that would provide accurate spatial data of the animal
origin and informative data on potential risk factors for
epidemiological investigations. Such data would be partic-
ularly useful in the case when environmental factors were
retrospectively analysed, for example, for risk mapping.
To implement the surveillance for animal diseases, sur-
veillance plans and systems should be designed and
adapted to the local socio-economic context. In low-
income countries, where financial and technical resources
are finite, it would be impossible to conduct nationwide
surveillance. Thus, surveillance efforts in the context
of weak infrastructure should be targeted in order to
maximize cost-effectiveness. Developing a targeted surveil-
lance within the concept of risk-based surveillance could
be accomplished by focusing on subpopulations that are
anticipated to have a higher risk of disease infections so as
to utilize fewer resources resulting from the smaller sam-
ple size required. Places such as markets and slaughter-
houses, where pigs from numerous origins commingle,
would be appropriate for sample collection because these
places facilitate the concentration and dissemination of
infectious agents from various geographical origins and
also provide a large source of biological samples that can
be collected at one time.
Given increasing global awareness of potential pandem-
ics, the main objective of surveillance for influenza A
viruses in pigs is to detect new strains of influenza viruses
early. These can be carried out directly by virus detection
or detecting its genetic material and also indirectly by
detecting antibodies (Torremorell et al., 2012) or using rel-
evant ‘markers’ through non-specific (syndromic) surveil-
lance. Virological monitoring by means of active
surveillance is usually recommended for studying the
genetic components of influenza viruses because the con-
tinued circulation of influenza viruses in pigs has raised
concerns about the risk for genetic evolution and potential
re-transmission of new variants back to humans with
increased pathogenicity (Liu et al., 2012; Trevennec et al.,
2012). However, due to the low isolation rates of influenza
viruses from pigs in East and South-East Asia (Trevennec
et al., 2011), a large number of biological samples would
need to be collected in order to successfully detect the
viruses. The practical use of virological monitoring is there-
fore impeded by its high cost, time consumption, high
technical demand for laboratory capacity and a need for
skilled workers.
Two main approaches of influenza surveillance are sug-
gested. Firstly, at-risk farms that are epidemiologically
linked to cases of influenza-like illness in pigs or humans
should be targeted. Importantly, specimens should be
obtained from both healthy and clinically ill pigs at those
farms as subclinical infections can occur. To promptly
detect farms with animals showing respiratory signs, a
good passive network and education campaign are
required in order to encourage farmers to report respira-
tory cases that could efficiently be organized through a
sentinel network of farms in a high-risk area. Secondly,
surveillance should be based on the assessment of anti-
body levels. Although serological data are often thought to
be of limited value as it could be complicated by maternal
antibodies, serologic cross-reactivity, endemic disease and
vaccination status in the country, the testing is rapid, rela-
tively inexpensive and easy to perform. Moreover, anti-
bodies could be detectable for several weeks so that the
chance of detecting antibodies is higher than that of
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detecting virus, which is limited by the short period of
virus shedding (Torremorell et al., 2012). In resource-lim-
ited countries, serological testing for disease surveillance is
therefore appropriate.
Seromonitoring could be used to indicate long-term
trends and to detect disease emergence by computing a
baseline of seroprevalence in defined pig populations. In
particular, systematic sample collection from pigs at
abattoirs would provide a good spatiotemporal picture
of circulating subtypes, because the pigs presented are
usually older than those on farms and consequently
have more opportunity to have been exposed to or
infected with influenza viruses. Defining a baseline level
of antibodies may help the early detection of influenza
outbreaks in target pig populations by recognizing an
increased seroprevalence. The use of a large panel of
antigens for HI assays is recommended to correctly
identify the dominant strains in the country and also to
rapidly detect any unusual subtypes of influenza A
viruses in pig populations. Furthermore, antigens for HI
tests should be regularly compared with those from cir-
culating strains in a given country or region (Sreta
et al., 2013).
Our study demonstrated an epidemiological analysis of
influenza A virus transmission in Cambodian pigs that
shows a positive association with the human population
density and a negative relationship with pig population
density. These unexpected results may be linked to poor
data collection and sampling strategy that could interfere
with the statistical analysis. The need for improved data
collection and surveillance schemes in Cambodia or other
countries where funds are limited has thus been empha-
sized. To further refine these surveillance strategies, a better
understanding of human–pig–avian interfaces and detailed
pig trade in the country are needed. Moreover, socio-
economic studies are required to adapt the surveillance
schemes to the local context.
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